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Abstract Effective management of water resources is a critical policy issue globally. Using a framework
developed by Turton, and a common set of characteristics describing key stages of water demand, we
examine the effectiveness of isolated technical (e.g., irrigation upgrades) and allocative (e.g., buyback)
efficiency for reducing water demand to sustainable levels. We base our analysis on Australia's water reform
context which offers an advanced example of applying these levers to achieve allocative and technical
efficiency. The study is motivated by appreciation of the benefits from increased policy flexibility and
adaptability in response to the following: potential transformations toward inflexible production systems;
uncertainty associated with impacts of climate change on future water reliability; and the need for
increased possible future equity between uses/users (productive/consumptive, environmental, cultural).
Our results highlight that a balance between technical and allocative efficiency mechanisms is necessary, as
neither is sufficient in isolation, when seeking to reduce total water use. This approach also enables a clearer
representation of uncertainty in future policy choices in many global settings with respect to water
demand reduction.
1. Introduction
Water demand curves are used to describe transitions in water supply and demand over time. Typical water
demand begins with initial periods of very low water use when society is learning about how to utilize water
supply (NWC, 2011). This period has been referred to as the exploratory stage. This is typically followed by
an expansion phase where rapid infrastructure growth increases total conjunctive water supply and policy
incentives to utilize resources. However, as the limits to total water supply are reached, water demand
may mature and further growth may cease as water use flattens. Supply limits, population change, climatic
events, shifts in public sentiment, and/or access to new information may require a reduction in total water
extraction toward sustainable levels, which constitutes a transition or contraction stage. Ideally, as societies
develop past peak supply, total water demand will reduce to a sustainable level or a new (lower) mature stage
of use that matches demand with system replenishment potential. However, this sustainable balanced level
is seldom achieved, and water scarcity remains a global concern (World Economic Forum, 2019) evidenced
by major cities facing increasing severe water shortages (e.g., Cape Town, Sao Paulo, Mexico City, Phoenix,
Harare, and Chennai).
A number of authors have explored water demand stages, suggesting policy/program solutions tomatch. For
example, Scheierling and Tréguer (2018) discussed transitions from expansion to maturity in water demand.
They recommend engineering (e.g., supply storage) interventions, where managers make better use of exist-
ing resources rather than necessarily developing new supply sources (Winpenny, 1997). This emphasizes
initial public investments followed by private intervention measures coupled to demand‐side policy (e.g.,
pricing) and sophisticated choice assessments. Randall (1981) explored water demand up to mature stages,
where demand‐side policies (property rights, pricing, and water marketing arrangements) were expected to
address externalities and the need for water reallocation. The practicality of market reallocation of water is
also discussed by the NationalWater Commission (2011) for the Australian context—which is arguably at an
advanced stage and undergoing contraction in agricultural water uses to favor reallocation to the environ-
ment. Few authors discuss the latter stages of water demand. Notable exceptions include Turton (1999) on
the issue of matching social adaptive capacity to sustainable extraction outcomes, Musgrave (2008) on the
increasing recognition of environmental water requirements in Australia's Murray‐Darling Basin (MDB)
and the need for sectoral water use shifts, andMai et al. (2019) with respect to the potential for water market
systems to facilitate sustainable water use over time. However, none of these authors offer empirical analysis
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of the success or likelihood of policy/program transitions toward sustainable extraction for contexts experi-
encing forced water demand contraction. The solutions they provide are solved with certainty, and either
accidentally or deliberately ignore complex questions such as the prevention of irreversible outcomes arising
from catastrophic tipping points (Loch, Adamson, et al., 2020) that may arise when dealing with uncertain
water supply and an insatiable demand for water. If policy continues to lack adaptive capacity, uncertainty
may force policy makers toward a continual and costly cycle of reform to deal with these complexities and
achieve allocation transformation.
Large‐scale transformation often does not sit well with existing policy design/assessment processes. Change
is costly to transact and therefore in conflict with the political economy of promise; that is, delivering effec-
tive policy solutions at low transaction costs and without the inequity generated by winners and losers.
Current/future water supply/demand is also highly uncertain in many contexts due to climate change
impacts (Milly et al., 2008). Alongside climate change, additional complexities emerge where traditional
objectives of economic growth are traded off against “emerging” objectives including environmental flows,
recognition of cultural rights, and/or the search for effective reallocation mechanisms. Some property right
reallocation “solutions” include the introduction of new rights, often in conflict with existing right owners
(Quiggin, 1986), or calls for compensation from those right owners who are part of the problem, and not
the solution. Further, current/future natural resource systems will likely operate very differently from when
many current policy, governance, and legal frameworks were designed (Polasky et al., 2019). Uncertainty
with respect to water demand paths beyond a contraction stage set us on what we term a fifth‐stage water
demand curve with ambiguous characteristics. Eventual fifth‐stage pathways will be revealed over time in
response to decisions made today and will ideally improve national welfare via the recognition of increasing
risk and uncertainty, an effective reallocation of resources in response, and a capacity to reflect dynamic
social expectations. An important question therefore is what policies/program levers may enable effective
transitions to sustainable water demand over time? Further, what evidence can be offered in support of
that view?
This paper utilizes a framework provided by Turton (1999) which suggests two main policy/program levers
for transitioning water systems toward optimal use: (i) investing in water efficiency upgrades (technical effi-
ciency) and/or (ii) the purchase of existing water rights (allocative efficiency). We further explore the role that
market signals, subsidized infrastructure incentives, and an uncertain future climate play in achieving water
demand contraction via the use of technical/allocative efficiency levers. We use Australia's MDB as a case
study—where water demand is currently in a contraction phase, with the view to achieving sustainable
extraction levels by 2024 (MDBA, 2012). We draw on several sources to create a set of criteria to describe
water demand stages to enable comparison of Turton's levers in the MDB context, and to examine the part
each plays in transitioning water demand toward sustainable levels. This offers an interesting perspective on
current arrangements in Australia that highlight barriers to achieving sustainable objectives in the MDB,
which may also be relevant for other jurisdictions facing similar future choices.
2. The Theoretical Framework
A set of water demand stages incorporating shifts over time to sustainable extraction via adaptive capacity is
espoused by Turton (1999), based on adaptive capacity work undertaken by Ohlsson (1999). In most settings,
initial surplus water slowly declines as demand pressures (e.g., population increase) drive exponential
growth. Total supply may be increased through storage (e.g., dams) and/or technical (e.g., efficiency) solu-
tions. However, total demand will eventually outstrip any additional supply created by storage or efficiency
gains, forcingmanagers to recognize maturity in supply/demand arrangements. If additional storage or tech-
nical supply‐side solutions cannot be identified to meet demand, managers will also be forced to recognize
requirements for a reduction in total water demand by some/all sectors to achieve sustainable extraction
levels. Reductions in total water use may then necessitate demand‐side solutions (e.g., pricing, increased
charges, sectoral reallocation) ahead of transitioning water users to a new future based on adaptation to
absolute scarcity.
In line with these water demand stages society may also experience transitions in required adaptive capacity
from initial supply‐side solutions, through demand‐side solutions, toward adaptive management allocations
of social resources (Quiggin, 1986). Water management phases will thus shift from receiving more water,
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through technical (e.g., water savings at user level) and allocative (water shifts between sectors) efficiency
solutions, to arrangements enabling adaptation to absolute scarcity (Figure 1). Critically, Turton (1999)
contends that the use of technical and allocative efficiency policy/programs to reduce total water demand
toward long‐term sustainable extraction levels are necessary, and insufficient on their own, for natural
resource reconstruction; that is, self‐replenishment of natural water endowments in the system. Thus
Turton's view would suggest that, where we follow single applications of technical or allocative efficiency
solutions to achieve long‐term sustainable extraction, transitions to later adaptation phases could follow
different end‐paths—that is, increasing, flat, or decreasing. Total demand may vary around that
sustainable level, but ideally will never exceed it; as indicated by the dashed line in the lower half of Figure 1.
These alternative end paths (e.g., accelerated resource destruction versus long‐term sustainability) are con-
sistent with suggestions from Rostow (1959) that, beyond maturity, economies could turn in one of three
major directions dependent upon the consequences of the previous phase. For example, overreliance on sec-
toral reallocation programs like water right buybacks from consumptive users could deplete political legiti-
macy in the eyes of water users and result in policy reversals—forcing total water demand above sustainable
extraction. Alternatively, overreliance on technical efficiency (e.g., on‐farm water savings) may result in
lower than expected reallocation and reduce political legitimacy in the eyes of nonwater users. It could
Figure 1. Links between increasing scarcity and adaptive capacity to achieve sustainable water use over time (adapted from Turton, 1999).
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also result in a need for further reductions in total water demand, beyond (expected) sustainable extraction
levels, to replenish system endowment capacity and meet minimum base flow requirements for river health
(which typically appear after thematurity stage, as depicted in the top‐half of Figure 1). Balanced approaches
would therefore be more likely to produce Turton's flat sustainable adaptation outcome.
2.1. Key Water Demand Stage Characteristics
Water reforms undertaken in Australia's MDB provide an opportunity to broadly assess the
necessity/sufficiency characteristics of Turton's framework. It also provides opportunity to evaluate
recommended combined technical/allocative efficiency policy/program approaches, and whether applica-
tions of single levers in isolation increases the probability of unsustainable water extraction/natural
resource reconstruction outcomes. Ultimately, any fifth‐stage demand curve should have a maximum
threshold limit, suggesting equitable and sustainable use outcomes consistent with Turton's assessment.
Comparing the levers suggested by Turton to drive equitable/sustainable outcomes first requires common
reform stage criteria. To establish a set of common criteria on which to base comparisons, we follow
Randall (1981), later adapted by Cummins and Watson (2012), and finally utilized by Adamson (2015)
to assess how Australian water policy reforms in the MDB (i) impact on water demand curve transitions
in response to growing water scarcity and (ii) deal with the complex nature of trade‐offs between all water
users. Table 1 details seven criteria with properties common to each of the water demand stages discussed
above, drawing parallels between criteria provided for the expansion stage in Scheierling and
Tréguer (2018) and the maturity stage in Randall (1981). For the contraction stage we draw on the
social‐ecological system characteristics described by Ostrom (2009) to embody sectoral transitions
and/or contractions in favor of other users (e.g., the environment). This approach is also aimed at identi-
fying an ultimate objective of equitable and sustainable water sharing arrangements consistent with
Turton's objective. It should be noted that there is no assumption of a sequential nature to these criteria,
although in some contexts that may be required (Young, 2014). However, a general demand transition
from expansion stages, through maturity, toward contraction is assumed.
We begin with long‐run supply of impounded water that reflects existing dam/weir storage and any potential
for new storages to increase total supply (Criteria 1). The physical condition of those storage/delivery sys-
tems will change over time, but also reduce opportunities for further new public storage construction as
“low‐hanging fruit” projects are exhausted (Criteria 2). Supply system characteristics can be set against
the total demand for delivered water (Criteria 3) which effectively matches the water demand curve
described previously. As limits to increased supply are reached, but demand continues to grow, the
security/reliability for existing users may be tested, highlighting a need for future demand‐side reallocation
mechanisms and/or institutional change (Criteria 4). Demand‐side mechanisms may include pricing and/or
water market programs; although in extreme supply periods (e.g., drought) prices and market‐based trans-
fers may reflect nonlinear (non‐convex) outcomes favoring some users over others and failing institutional
equity tests (Baumol & Bradford, 1972) (Criteria 5). A growing recognition of non‐convex solutions may
require social costs to subsidize increased water use—at least in the short term (Criteria 6). Finally, water
managers may become more exposed to and familiar with both the positive and negative externalities from
water use (Criteria 7) and be better equipped to evaluate policy/program transitions to equitable and sustain-
able extraction level objectives (Ultimate Objective). Table 1 applies these criteria across the four stages of
water reform in Australia to provide a common set of sustainable adaptation criteria, while Table 2 provides
some examples of those sustainable adaptation evaluation criteria with respect to the four stages of water
demand transitions in Australia's MDB.
Policies or programs aimed at managing uncertainty will undoubtedly be expensive in terms of short‐run
institutional transaction costs (Loch & Gregg, 2018), take longer to implement/realize, and thus may be at
odds with political legitimacy. We will return to this in the section 9. In the next section, we detail our
case study of water demand transitions in the MDB as an initial basis for our analysis of Turton's
framework.
3. Australian Water Demand Transitions
Australian water reform in the MDB provides world‐leading examples of policy design and implementa-
tion aimed at addressing dynamic demand changes within highly uncertain and constrained water supply
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conditions. Price signals, polluting behavior deterrents, shared environmental rights, welfare savings, and
market‐based reallocation mechanisms are all features of the Australian policy arrangements (Krutilla &
Alexeev, 2014). The design and implementation of market‐based reallocation mechanisms required
significant investments to reduce demand in the MDB via a Cap on further water extraction, and
unbundling (separation) of land and water rights to enable reallocation between users. More recently,
policy reforms have focused on buying back water rights from willing irrigators (agricultural sector) to
Table 1
Parallels Between Maturing Water Demand and Social‐Ecological Subsystem (SES) Criteria/Objectives
Expansion Maturity Contraction Sustainable adaptation evaluation criteria
Scheierling and Tréguer (2018) Randall (1981) Ostrom (2009) Relate to Turton (1999)
Supply of agricultural water Long run supply Resource units (1) Long‐run supply from impounded water
Comprehensive assessment of
hydrologic and institutional contexts
Physical condition of
impoundment and
delivery systems
Resource systems (2) Physical condition of impound/delivery system
Demand for agricultural water Demand for delivered
water
Users (3) Demand for delivered water
Interdependence among users and
need to address trade‐offs
Competition for water
among uses, and
maintenance
Related ecosystems (4) Improved security/reliability for all water users
Interventions – especially demand‐side Social cost of subsidizing
increased use
Social, economic and
political settings
(5) Non‐convex demand solutions in water markets
(6) Social costs of subsidizing increased water use
Significant externalities – focus on
environmental flows and the value of
water
Externality problems Interactions and outcomes
to other SES's, among
other things
(7) Externality recognition and management
Ultimate objective: Equitable and sustainable water‐sharing arrangements
Table 2
Assessing the Four Stages of Water Development in Australia's Murray‐Darling Basin
Sustainable adaptation evaluation criteria Exploration Expansion Maturity
Contraction/
environmental
Long‐run supply from impounded water Elastic Elastic to Inelastic Inelastic Inelastic
Physical condition of impound/delivery
system
Little to no
infrastructure. All
infrastructure
systems are new
Public‐funded infrastructure
is in new to good condition
Aging public infrastructure
in need of expensive
repair, upgrade, or
replacement
No new large‐scale public
infrastructure
Demand for delivered water Minimal, often no or
minimum charges to
access water
Low but growing demand.
Elastic (but not perfectly) at
low prices; inelastic at high
prices
High and increasing
demand. Elastic at low
prices; inelastic at high
prices. Market failures
High but stable demand.
Elastic at low prices;
inelastic (but not
perfectly) at high prices.
Market reallocation
Improved security/reliability for all water
users
Not applicable (only
during extreme
drought or
low‐supply events)
Minimal but increasing.
Drought exposure prompts
new rounds of investment
in long‐run supply
Intense apart from periods
of increased supply (e.g.
flooding)
Reallocation improves
security/reliability for all
users
Non‐convex demand solutions in water
markets
Nil Nil Yes (increasing frequency
of occurrence)
Yes (stable frequency of
occurrence)
Social costs of subsidizing increased water
use
Zero to very low Low High and rising Should be nil
Externality recognition and management Nil Minimal Extensive externalities
(mainly negative)
Reduction (increase) in
negative (positive)
externalities
Equitable and sustainable water‐share
arrangements
No No No Yes
Source: Adapted from Adamson (2015).
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recover water to support ecological functions (environmental sector) under the 2007 Water Act that
empowers a basin‐wide management Plan (hereafter Basin Plan) incorporating sustainable diversion lim-
its (SDLs) and agreed social, economic, and environmental water use objectives (Wheeler et al., 2014). To
get to this point, water policy in Australia experienced four major stages of demand transition as
described below.
3.1. Supply‐Side Solutions
3.1.1. Exploratory Stage
The period of water reforms from European settlement to approximately 1915 is referred to as the
Exploratory Stage (Musgrave, 2008). During this period, the allocation of water resources was via riparian
rights. The 1886 Victorian Irrigation Act first altered riparian rights so that ownership and control of water
resources were vested with the states (in the MDB these include Queensland, New South Wales (NSW),
Victoria, and South Australia), allowing state‐centralized management and greater utility of larger areas.
New water entitlement rights that varied with the climatic conditions were created to provide a proportion,
rather than a fixed, volume of water to users which was novel in comparison to the rest of the world
(Connell, 2007). At the time of Federation in 1901, the new Constitution upheld state rights to own and
use water for conservation and irrigation (Waye & Son, 2010), requiring cooperative arrangements to design
and implement water policy that persist to this day.
3.1.2. Expansion (Growth) Stage
The second period of reforms (1915 to the 1970s) is referred to as the Expansion Stage (Musgrave, 2008).
During this period, water resource and irrigation development comprised a nation‐building exercise to
drought‐proof the country (Davidson, 1969). After Federation, the states controlled and operated water
resources. However, federal government funding helped to develop irrigation schemes and
soldier‐settlement farms for successive returning servicemen after World War One, World War Two, and
the Korean and Malayan Operations (NWC, 2011). This period saw a shift of water resources from naviga-
tion uses to irrigated production, a tenfold increase in major dam storage capacity, and protectionist agricul-
tural policy including imported product tariffs, production controls and quotas, price reserve schemes, and
statutory marketing to bolster irrigation water uses and food security (Industry Commission, 1991). Each
state responded differently to these signals. For example, NSW agriculture was dominated by annual crops
such as rice and cotton under incentives to use all water each year (Musgrave, 2008). Victorian farmers
invested in dairy and horticulture with higher fixed‐water demand characteristics requiring reliable supply
sources and conservative water management (Bjornlund & Mckay, 2001). Finally, South Australian water
users focused on irrigated horticulture and navigational uses of water that, closer to the end of the river sys-
tem, required even more conservative management attitudes (Crase, 2008).
3.2. Demand‐Side Solutions—Including Technical and Allocative Efficiency
3.2.1. Maturity Stage
Water policy in the 1960s and 1970s reflected a growing awareness of limits to water resources. South
Australian moratoriums on new water entitlements in 1969 were followed by a general 10% reduction in
volumetric allocations by 1979 (Bjornlund & O'Callaghan, 2003). NSW imposed catchment‐specific embar-
goes on new entitlements in 1977, and a full state embargo in 1981. Victorian rights to pump from unregu-
lated streams during summer months ceased after the 1967/1968 drought, effectively capping extraction at
existing levels. However, total extraction already exceeded sustainable levels causing environmental degra-
dation in the form of widespread algal bloom events, rising soil and water salinity, and flora/fauna species
losses (Connell, 2007). Informal seasonal trade capacity allowed the states to redistribute water under discre-
tionary powers aligned with granting/withdrawing licenses (Clark &Moore, 1985) and policy preferences in
favor of consumptive (e.g., irrigation) water use. However, as agriculture protectionist policies began to
wane and new low‐cost water storage infrastructure sites were largely exhausted, the need to incorporate
environmental water externalities (e.g., salinity) in water management agreements became increasingly
apparent (MDBC, 2007). Economists suggested water reallocation should be achieved via markets with
inputs/outputs valued at their economic cost (AWRC, 1986). These factors meant that water policy had
shifted to aMature Stage (1980s to 2007) characterized by appreciation of the limits on river systems, federal
powers increasingly being applied to resource management, and arguments for market‐based
reallocation (Randall, 1981).
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Market‐based reallocation required several reforms. First, riparian rights were gradually replaced with leg-
islative arrangements and de jure property rights recognized by formal legal instruments that, if challenged
jurisdictionally or administratively, would most likely be upheld (Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). Second, land
and water rights were unbundled to enable transfers in response to risk, seasonal conditions, and/or strate-
gic planning. Unbundling was essential for market‐based reallocation to work effectively and efficiently
(Wilson & Francis, 2010). Low levels of trade occurred from the early 1980s (South Australia), with NSW
and Victoria experiencing transfers by the early 1990s. Third, a 1995 audit of river flows concluded that
median annual flow‐to‐sea levels were 27% of natural, creating drought‐like flow patterns in 60% of years
as compared with 5% under natural conditions (MDBMC, 1996). On July 1 1997 regulators imposed a Cap
on further extraction in the MDB. Fourth, the states were encouraged to introduce water management
and planning arrangements to address overallocation and achieve sustainable (contracted) levels of
extraction. However, by 2004 many states had failed to deliver on these commitments, and water plan-
ning proved inadequate for the reallocation task (NWC, 2007). Finally, early assessments of water reallo-
cation requirements to achieve sustainable outcomes concluded that a ~1,900 GL (or about 1.5 million
acre‐feet) reduction in current demand could achieve a moderate probability of future environmental
health (Jones et al., 2003).
3.3. Adaptive Management
3.3.1. Environmental (Contraction) Stage
Recognition of the need to reallocate water from consumptive (e.g., irrigation) to environmental uses trig-
gered an Environmental Stage (2007 to present)—also described as a contraction phase (Watson &
Cummins, 2010). A series of intergovernmental agreements set requirements for water recovery via market
mechanisms and/or efficiency investments (COAG, 2004a) and made the states responsible for achieving
sustainable extraction levels (COAG, 2004b)—largely mirroring Turton's (1999) technical/allocative effi-
ciency levers. In addition, the Basin Plan was enacted with periodic reviews (MDBA, 2012). Part of the
Basin Plan addresses the need for a better understanding of all conjunctive water resources—including
groundwater regulation to increase sustainable future management—to recognize nonlinear relationships
(Chiew et al., 1992) and an attempt to manage both known future risks, as well as uncertainties (Carey
& Zilberman, 2002).
Three significant water recovery programs have been implemented. First, The Living Murray (TLM) initia-
tive invested ~AU$1 billion to recover 500 GL between 2005 and 2009 using a mixture of technical (irrigation
upgrade) and allocative (buyback) efficiency levers. Second, under a new recovery target of up to 3,200 GL
the federal Restoring the Balance (RtB) program invested AU$3.1 billion to purchase up to 1,500 GL of water
entitlements from willing sellers between 2008 and 2015. This was coupled with the Sustainable Rural
Water‐Use and Infrastructure Program (SRWUIP) which will ultimately invest AU$8.4 billion to achieve
up to 1,700 GL of water savings. These water recovery targets can be reduced if water managers can achieve
environmental (sustainable) objectives with (i) less water (i.e., supply measures), (ii) greater delivery system
efficiency savings (i.e., efficiency measures), and/or (iii) more effective environmental water delivery in
future (i.e., constraint measures); as long as they avoid negative socioeconomic impacts (MDBMC, 2014).
Progress as at 30 June 2019 suggests 2,100 GL have been recovered toward the SDL target, including the
adjustment mechanisms listed above (DAWR, 2019).
4. Framework and Critical Assessment Results
In this section we evaluate themajor policy/program levers implemented in theMDB as discussed to achieve
the Environmental Stage (i.e., contraction of consumptive resource use) which should lead autonomously to
adjustment capacity, with little recourse to further policy or intervention. Further, we evaluate what current
policy lever implementation suggests for necessary future reforms in the MDB, and how this might inform
other water management contexts. Current MDB reallocation policies (Table 2) allow us to assess how well
different policy elements align with water reform stage characteristics and their objectives according to
Turton (1999). Following that, we can assess where current MDB reforms may not be responding effectively
to evolving, more demanding, and multifacetted sustainability objectives. Subsequently, we posit what tra-
jectory any fifth‐stage water demand may assume. First, recall the ideal characteristics of the Environmental
(Contraction) Stage shown in Table 2, adopted under the Basin Plan to achieve water demand reductions and
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a transition to sustainable extraction levels. In addition, our common water demand characteristics can be
applied across the three recovery programs described above (i.e., increased groundwater access under new
regulation, SRWUIP technical efficiency, and RtB allocative efficiency) to analyze their effectiveness with
respect to sustainability objectives.
4.1. Groundwater Regulation
Groundwater resources in the MDB are viewed by water managers as underutilized, with capacity for
expanded extraction. Increasing access to groundwater under the Basin Plan (MDBA, 2012) is resulting in
elastic supplies of water resources in the short run, via relatively new infrastructure maintained by private
users. We expect demand to be high and stable, inelastic at higher prices, and increased total water demand
should see resources reallocated to consumptive users such as irrigators over time, as surface water supply
decreases. Some non‐convex market reallocation may occur during extreme supply events where uncer-
tainty results in short‐run adaptation (e.g., inflated water market prices). But overall the impact to
positive/negative externalities should be low together with the social cost of subsidizing groundwater invest-
ment. Thus, the sustainability of MDB groundwater systems, and the effectiveness of this policy in contribut-
ing to a contraction of water demand, will depend on the final water user where any future increased
negative environmental externalities will signal failure. As such, the groundwater component of the Basin
Plan contains elements of both the Expansion and Environmental Stages as defined in the preceding
section (Table 3).
4.2. Allocative Efficiency via Buyback
By contrast the government RtB program, underpinned by a tender‐driver buyback of water entitlements
from willing sellers (irrigators) to reallocate water to environmental objectives, is not expected to reduce
the inelastic supply of water (following redistribution). Infrastructure will be maintained by irrigators (on‐-
farm and off‐farm), and increasingly by public programs via environmental manager contributions to costs
(off‐farm and new structures at environmental sites). Demand will remain high and stable, but consumptive
water availability may decrease in some years; potentially increasing competition among irrigation users.
This will drive non‐convex market solutions in such years where sectoral access to allocative efficiency
mechanisms may be limited. However, there are no social costs of subsidized water uses, and reduced
(increased) negative (positive) externalities. The result is arguably equitable and appears to drive sustainable
water‐sharing arrangements that most closely resemble an Environmental (Contraction) Stage of
demand (Table 3).
4.3. Technical Efficiency via SWRUIP
Last, we examine the SRWUIP recovery component via investments in on‐ and off‐farm water use technical
efficiency (Table 3). Long‐run supply will remain inelastic as no new large‐scale storages are built. However,
a significant proportion of relatively small‐scale water infrastructure will be new, subsidized, and more
expensive to operate (Adamson & Loch, 2018). Demand will likely increase, particularly during drought
events, and total water use may increase under changes to land use or irrigation practices (Ward &
Pulido‐Velazquez, 2008). If commodity transitions also occur, then competition for water resources will
increase with non‐convex market solutions becoming more evident (Adamson et al., 2017). Importantly, if
production systems (economic, natural, cultural, and social) transition toward requiring fixed water inputs
in all years, then the delivery system will become less flexible and exposed (Loch, Adamson, et al., 2020).
It is possible that the social costs of achieving these outcomes will be relatively high, increasing over time as
investment options diminish; especially while water savings continue to be split equally (i.e., 50/50) between
irrigators and the environmental water holder (Loch et al., 2014). Uncertainty surrounding savings from
technical efficiency will undermine any assessment of equitable and sustainable water sharing, indicating
that the components of the Basin Plan resemble both Expansion andMaturity Stages of demand. This assess-
ment suggests that, where the components are jointly applied (i.e., technical and allocative efficiency pro-
grams are balanced) contracted water demand is achievable consistent with Turton's framework, while
groundwater access provides a basis for adaptive future management. However, the Basin Plan has varied
Turton's balanced approach over time, as detailed below.
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4.4. Technical/Allocative Efficiency Applications in the MDB
The MDB case study exhibits general policy applications of technical and allocative efficiency programs to
reduce water demand in an Environmental Stage. However, the two levers have not been routinely utilized
at the same time. For example, in TLM program allocative efficiency formed part of the policy but this was
overshadowed by technical efficiency projects to recover water. Ultimately, the program had to be length-
ened—and the funding doubled to AU$1 billion—to achieve 225 GL of water savings through technical effi-
ciency projects (DotE, 2014); though TLMwater does not contribute to demand contraction objectives in the
Basin Plan (Adamson & Loch, 2014). By contrast, environmental water recovery under the AU$13.1 billion
RtB and SWRUIP programs began toward the end of the Millennium Drought (2000–2010) with a focus on
allocative efficiency buyback from willing sellers (2008–2011). After a return to normal supply conditions,
pressure was bought to bear on the federal government to downscale buyback in favor of technical efficiency
(Australian Parliament, 2011). In effect the government had lost its political legitimacy with irrigators.
Despite suggested means by which buyback could be made more attractive to end‐users, and address some
of the design issues (Bark et al., 2014), by 2015 buyback had been capped at 1,500 GL of total recovery
(DotE, 2015), and technical efficiency became the main policy lever in play.
A focus on SWRUIP technical efficiency has in turn raised concerns about the cost per recovery unit (Loch
et al., 2014), return flow impacts on environmental flows (Grafton & Williams, 2019), and the accuracy of
water savings (Adamson & Loch, 2014)—causing government to lose legitimacy with much of the scientific
and wider community. While some reports state that it is not the volume but the application of recovered
water that is important (Wang et al., 2018), many scientists remain concerned about the emphasis on tech-
nical efficiency projects to generate demand contraction alone. Alongside this, economists have raised con-
cerns that the most cost‐effective pathway to water recovery (buyback from willing sellers) has been
underutilized and as a consequence, and the recovered water has come at a much greater cost to taxpayers
than necessary (Loch et al., 2014).
Table 3
Comparing Key Characteristics of the Basin Plan to Turton's (1999) Sustainable Adaptation Water Demand Outcomes
Sustainable adaptation evaluation criteria
Ideal characteristics of
the Environmental Stage
Basin plan policy characteristics
Groundwater RtB SRWUIP
Long‐run supply from impounded water Inelastic Elastic in the short run Inelastic Inelastic
Physical condition of impound/delivery
system
No new large‐scale
public infrastructure
Private infrastructure new
and maintained by users
On‐farm infrastructure
maintained by private
users, off‐farm unknown
Public infrastructure (on‐ and
off‐farm) new and
subsidized
Demand for delivered water High but stable
demand. Elastic at
low prices; inelastic
(but not perfectly) at
high prices. Market
reallocation
High but stable demand.
Elastic at low prices;
inelastic at high prices.
Some market failure.
Water use increases
High but stable demand.
Elastic at low prices;
inelastic at high prices
Market reallocation
decreases water use
High, potentially increasing
demand in droughts.
Elastic at low prices; inelastic
at high prices
Water use may increase
Improved security/reliability for all water
users
Reallocation improves
security/reliability for
all users
Reallocation of
groundwater to
irrigators
Reallocation increases
security/reliability for all
users
Reallocation results in
regional winners/losers for
water security/reliability
Non‐convex demand solutions in water
markets
Yes (stable frequency of
occurrence)
Yes but with low
probability
Yes with stable frequency Yes with increasing
frequency
Social costs of subsidizing increased water
use
Should be nil Nil to very low Nil High and rising as
low‐hanging fruit
expended
Externality recognition and management Reduction (increase) in
negative (positive)
externalities
No impact Reduction in externalities
and social costs
Some reduction in
externalities but social
costs remain high
Equitable and sustainable water‐share
arrangements
Yes Depends on the final user Yes No
Stage the policy component resembles Elements of Expansion and
Environmental Stages
Elements of Environmental
Stage
Elements of Expansion and
Maturity Stages
Source: Adapted from Adamson (2015).
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Consequently, the policy discussion surrounding water recovery in the MDB has turned toxic, with farmers
arguably oversupported by current policy, and scientists and economists arguing for a return to allocative
efficiency programs such as buyback (e.g., Adamson & Loch, 2018). In the MDB case study there was a brief
period when both levers were in operation (~2009–2012), which by contrast with current debate appeared
quite calm. This offers some support for Turton's framework; that is, when both levers are operating all par-
ties are (un)happy to some degree, but placated with some technical/allocative efficiency contributions to
recovery objectives.
Consistent with Quiggin's (2014) reflections on climate change policy and the use of different programs (e.g.,
carbon pricing versus renewable energy targets) in a context of financial and political trade‐offs, our analysis
suggests that Turton's framework has some value in describing appropriate pathways to effective water
demand reduction. In support of this claim, and the implications of current policy decisions for alternative
pathways to a fifth stage, we offer three additional examples using stylized data to emphasize likely water
supply/demand outcomes from the use of technical and allocative efficiency levers. The requirement for bal-
ance is found in their opposite effects.
5. Stylized Examples
Any imbalance between the studied policy levers may create incentives that misallocate resources. We illus-
trate this by providing a set of oversimplified equations. Assuming demand = supply, orD= S, we can repre-
sent the supply equation as:
S ¼ usw þ lswð Þ þ ugw þ lgw
 
(1)
Supply is a combination of water use (u) and system losses (l) to move water from location to location
through conjunctive sources (e.g., surface (sw) or groundwater (gw)). For simplicity we focus on surface
water—although groundwater could also be examined via equation 1. A surface water entitlement E, such
as that of an irrigator, is represented as (E) = (usw+lsw), and for this argument we assume that E = S. In
our example there are two forms of arbitrary supply: a Mature Stage (S1), and a Contraction Stage (S2).
This assumes S1 > S2 and that a change to demand is required. As before, to shift from S1 to S2 we could
invest in system improvements (technical efficiency) and/or purchases of E (allocative efficiency) to change
usw and/or lsw. Below, we drop the (sw) notation and address each investment option separately.
5.1. Technical Efficiency—Network Savings Example
Where S1 = (u1+l1) = E, as l1 → S1 entitlement reliability will decrease and more water will be needed to
deliver residual u1. Losses, l1 comprise conveyance values (seepage or evaporation), minimum ecological
base flows as shown in Figure 1, and/or groundwater recharge. To reduce l1 a focus on savings in the delivery
network through technical efficiency gains is required. Technical efficiency gains may result in win‐win
situations; that is, technical efficiency investments may change l1 so that S1 > S2 and u1 > u2. We illustrate
this as follows. Assume total system E is owned by irrigators (individual farmers Ef) and the network man-
ager (EN), such that∑E = (Ef+EN). If S1=1200 ML (or about 970 acre‐feet) of which Ef = (u1+l1) = 950ML
+50ML= 1,000ML, and EN= (l1) = 200ML, then farmers receive a 95% reliable entitlement (i.e., 950/1,000),
and 200ML is required to deliver irrigation water. In manyMDB irrigation systems, users are shareholders in
the network and may benefit equally from efficiency gains (i.e., 50/50 equal share of any water savings).
Thus, if we require S2=1,150ML (i.e., a 50 ML contraction in system losses) total loss reductions will need
to be 100 ML—where 50 ML of savings is assumed to return (r) to irrigators. In that case, S2=1150 ML, of
which Ef= (u1+l1+r) = 950ML+50ML+50ML= 1,050ML and EN= (l2) = 100ML. Note that if entitlement
reliability remains at 95% irrigators now have 997.5 ML of water at their disposal, which could drive total
irrigated area increases (Adamson & Loch, 2014) and a wealth transfer in favor of consumptive users.
5.2. Technical Efficiency—Farm Savings Example
Alternatively, where S1 = (u1+l1) = E, as u1 → S1 this suggests savings should be sought on‐farm from
lower‐scale investments. Logically, funds could be directed toward productive efficiency (e.g., increased
yield/ML) and/or application efficiency (e.g., reduced field/channel loss) projects. These options could be
described as u1 = (c+m+a+v), where c is the water volume used by crops, m is how water is delivered
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within the farm, a is the application technology, and v is a varietal choice of commodity that may use less
water inputs (Adamson & Loch, 2019). Repeating the previous example, assume S1=1200 ML, of which
Ef= (u1+l1) = 950ML+50ML= 1,000ML, and u1 = (7+0.5+1.5+0.5)ML/ha, giving us 100 ha of production.
To achieve S2=1,150 ML, we must save 0.5 ML/ha (i.e., 100 × 0.5 = 50 ML) via changes to the following:
commodity/varietal choice (e.g., wheat over lucerne planting), irrigation practices (e.g., deficit irrigation),
management practices (e.g., irrigation timing), farm design (e.g., channel lining), and/or application tech-
nology (e.g., central pivot over flood). To benefit, irrigators must therefore consider combined investments
into c,m, a, and v to achieve 100ML of savings—of which they will receive 50ML back. However, decisions
not only change what is produced (increased or decreased production area), but also potentially the delivery
system, field losses, water use by variety, and/or the amount of water available to downstream users where
that supply was dependent on (for example) return flows—especially where such interactions are not prop-
erly accounted for or recognized in the system (Adamson & Loch, 2014)—although we note that, if system
models suggest return flows are zero, then arguably there are no savings to bemade in the first place. In sum,
these choices provide insight into the decision‐maker's risk attitudes, which may be averse. As with many
technical efficiency programs, public subsidy incentives may help to change this risk attitude, triggering
transformation at the farm level, wider sectoral adjustment, and possible downward pressure on predicted
future returns. Note though that, in this case, expected entitlement reliability will not necessarily increase
as the irrigator would be required to locate savings and surrender them.
5.3. Allocative Efficiency—Entitlement Buyback Example
As a last example, if water recovery can only be sourced from entitlement purchases, reduction could come
from underutilized entitlements or sellers willing to relinquish short‐run productive opportunities/risk miti-
gation. Again, if S1=1,200ML of which Ef= (u1+l1) = 950ML+50ML= 1,000ML, and u1 = 9.5 ML/ha, then
the 50 ML savings required for S2 = 1,150 ML must come from retiring 5.26 ha of production (50 ML/9.5
ML). By contrast, buyback offers a far “cleaner” set of circumstances under which savings are achieved,
and also a more accurate signal of water value for both irrigators and recovery buyers. Further, buyback
may provide capital for irrigators to reduce farm debt, buy water in the future, and/or to privately invest
in efficiency gains—providing second round benefits in the market/industry sector. Note also in this case
that the entitlement reliability will not change—and that same reliability will transfer completely to
the buyer.
5.4. Market Price Impact From Allocative Versus Technical Efficiency
Consistent with our earlier assertion of uncertain fifth‐stage outcomes, the examples presented above high-
light that total water used on‐farm can increase/decrease depending on the policy lever choice/setting,
which may also be reflected in future water market prices and irrigator asset values. Where irrigation net-
work upgrades are selected, total supply and/or entitlement reliability (as a function of use and losses)
may increase—along with a potential increased demand for that entitlement (Figure 2a). The movement
of both supply and demand may create mixed market signals, including mixed outcomes for price, depen-
dent upon elasticities (Adamson et al., 2017). By contrast, where on‐farm efficiency upgrade investments
or entitlement buyback are selected, total supply will contract without change in demand (Figures 2b and
2c). Further, as prices increase, entitlement owners gain wealth from the appreciation in asset base—where
buyback signals will be immediate, but on‐farm efficiency signals will take time to emerge through the mar-
ket (as indicated by the dotted line). Increased time to achieve price signaling change may also result in
increased perceived (unfounded) fears about impacts from market speculation.
In summary, these examples offer additional support to the different end path outcomes suggested by
Turton (1999), and a need for balanced approaches to achieve sustainable demand following contraction
efforts—which will be costly to enact. Further, these examples speak to the importance of fully accounting
for system losses and a required understanding of the differentials between S1 and S2 prior to making
policy/program investment decisions. While this issue has been noted by others (e.g., Grafton &
Williams, 2019) in some respects greater clarity is offered by the examples above. In the final section of this
paper we elaborate on these findings and highlight some additional issues that may be relevant to Australian
water managers approaching an (uncertain) fifth stage of water reforms, as well as other contexts considering
their own transitions to reduced total water demand.
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6. Discussion
The development of water policies in Australia provides a useful example to illustrate issues including: the
impact of past policy decisions, the role of generating and incorporating new information, and challenges for
reflecting social expectations in policy processes and decisions. The paper also checks Turton's conclusions
that both allocative and technical efficiency policy levers are necessary/insufficient on their own for natural
resource reconstruction outcomes. While further assessment is needed to fully test these claims—for exam-
ple using qualitative comparative assessment techniques—we would agree with Turton's assessment in the
case of Australia's water reforms. An imbalance in these levers would suggest ultimate slippage in contrac-
tion gains, where one program may in fact cannibalize the successes of the other (Adamson & Loch, 2018).
Ultimately, any fifth‐stage of reforms must be capable of adapting to (i) on‐going uncertainty associated with
climate change impacts on future water reliability; (ii) any transaction costs associated with adaptation; (iii)
social consultation to reflect dynamic change; and (iv) the relevance of minimum ecological base flows in
river systems.
6.1. Uncertainty and Adaptability
Effective policy design and assessment must account for uncertainty and unawareness of how to adapt to
future realized events, such as climate change impacts on water supply quantities and quality. We do not
focus on water quality issues in this paper, as here our attention is upon reducing the total quantity of water
consumption. That said, negative water quality issues may appear in the Maturity Stage, when externalities
(e.g., blue‐green algal outbreaks) could severely impact the full range of users. Advancing to the Contraction
Stage should increase the probability of water available for dilution improvements, increasing total water
quality as per common property theory (Ciriacy‐Wantrup & Bishop, 1975). However, for both water quantity
and quality issues uncertainty is increasing through more refined understandings of nature‐human interac-
tions (Norgaard, 2010), and because scarcity, innovation and rising population disturb the balance of envir-
onmental protection and economic development (Tainter, 2011). Typical stages of change (e.g., product life
cycles) might experience renewal or shifts back to expansion on the basis of technological innovation.
Current political fascination with technical efficiency innovations to grow total water supply in many areas
around the world follows such thinking. However, in water, opportunities for (cost‐effective) growth or
large‐scale supply expansion akin to product life cycle transformations are limited—if possible at all.
Complex water problems will require nuanced policy responses featuring capacity to (ideally) respond
proactively in the face of dynamic adjustment requirements and shifting social objectives, as we have tried
to accommodate through our use of Ostrom's (2009) design principles in Table 1. We have therefore argued
in this paper that flexible policy and program solutions should involve both allocative and technical effi-
ciency programs to achieve sectoral demand change.
As such, evidence‐based policy must prevail; emotion should have no place in policy
design/implementation. One approach for dealing with increased future uncertainty may be to combine
familiar policy assessments (e.g., cost‐benefit analysis) with innovative models such as state‐contingent ana-
lysis that use scenarios to capture adaptation to future variability and uncertainty of systems, including
low‐probability extreme events at the tails of distributions (Quiggin, 2018). This is the subject of current
research into the riskiness of stochastic water supply, and the viability of encouraged investments in
Figure 2. (a) Network efficiency. (b) On‐farm efficiency. (c) Buyback.
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water‐use efficiency to reduce that riskiness. The findings of this research are discussed elsewhere (Adamson
& Loch, 2019). However, we would expect that the findings reported herein will be important for informing
future policy selection and program design in developing nation contexts, consistent with the advice pro-
vided by Gruère et al. (2018).
6.2. The Transaction Costs of Adaptation
The process of transitioning existing policy/programs to more adaptive arrangements—or creating new poli-
cies with inherent adaptive characteristics—will be complex and challenging. As our understanding of
issues increases through scientific research in response to changes in social priorities and/or management
requirements, this complexity also grows. Perhaps this is one reason why science and policy are drawing
further apart, as the differential between useful and available information supporting quick and easy solu-
tions in a political context—and scientific goals of rigorous, informed, and consistent information—becomes
stark. Yet the complex nature of these problems and our growing appreciation of future uncertainty for
many natural resources suggests a need for governance capable of change and adaptive learning in response.
Adaptive policy combining social expectations and rigorous science is possible. Salinity management in the
MDB provides an example, where public institution investments over 30 years have resulted in the follow-
ing: positive (and increasing) reductions to riverine salinity levels based on ex‐post performance assess-
ments, flexible management arrangements despite a reliance on engineering interventions to achieve
those reductions, and improved scientific knowledge of management options (Loch & Gregg, 2018). This
case suggests that natural resource policy can transverse a tendency toward meeting objectives combining
governance requirements of today, incorporating new information, and meeting social expectations of
tomorrow. But it also stresses the critical importance of investing correctly over a sustained period (beyond
political cycles) to achieve success.
6.3. Social Consultation to Reflect Dynamic Change
In latter stages of demandmanagement wemay also be confronted with new uses that will need to be added.
As the need for an expanded set of market property rights is recognized—that might include cultural flows
(Jackson et al., 2019) or altered demand from ecosystems following severe fires and landscape change—
effective policy will require mechanisms capable of incorporating changes into new/existing arrangements
and implementing appropriate assessment metrics to assist in evaluating progress toward new collective
objectives. Thus, another issue contributing to the emergence of a fifth stage of water reforms in Australia
is the dynamic nature of social expectations and increasing community involvement in decisions about
the management of natural resources. At a broad scale this shift to greater community involvement has been
linked to a growing awareness of the complexity and interconnectedness of many environmental and social
policy problems (Hartz‐Karp et al., 2010). Locally, this could be linked to the growing distrust of institutions
in Australia (AICD and KPMG, 2018), the dynamic nature of social expectations, and the emerging issue of
irrigators' social license (e.g., Martin & Shepheard, 2011). The increasing involvement of community expec-
tations and potency of social license issues has implications for policy. Any policy change may result in a
transfer of welfare from one group to another (Shleifer, 2005); for example, from irrigators to the broader
community, or from upstream to downstream water users. As we have discussed, the task for policy makers
is to manage the trade‐offs between different groups in society, their respective expectations for change, and
facilitate social change toward collective desired long‐term equity and sustainability outcomes, again high-
lighting the relevance of the connections shown in Table 1.
To achieve this balance, policy makers will need to employ information from social and natural sciences at
all stages of policy design and implementation. As discussed, risk and uncertainty would feature promi-
nently in the debate. Finding the common interaction point between science and policy will be critical in
future natural resource policy design/effective implementation.
6.4. The Importance of Base Flows
Finally, we return to the importance of ecological base flows in water governance arrangements, as a specific
feature of any fifth stage of demand reform. Base flows can be thought of as a critical “line in the sand” for
many water governance contexts, where any reduction of resources below that line (somewhere between
the blue line and the sustainable extraction level in Figure 1) represent increased risk of irreversible
long‐term natural, social, cultural, and financial capital loss. Where those same base flows provide the
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basis for consumptive benefits to other users (e.g., flows on which to piggyback conveyance water, recrea-
tional flows, esthetic gains) they should be fully protected and awarded priority status within the system of
rights that arise from policy development or change. Further, where base flows are prioritized and achieved
we may have to lower the sustainable resource reallocation threshold. As discussed, where possible, changes
should be openly communicated to users ahead of design and implementation and consulted upon widely
before adoption.
Australia is presently struggling with illegal extraction of base flows, and how best to more adequately detect
infringements, prosecute offenders, and recoup losses to ecological functions (Loch, Carmody, et al., 2019).
The situation in Australia suggests future research should be focused on better understanding the nature of
resource demand, supply, quality, and vulnerability to a range of shocks beyond climate change to enable
informed policy making and investment choices. In the absence of proper enforcement, existing users
may exceed their rights, and third parties without rights may also attempt to profit. Therefore, failure to
properly account for total water use may mean that current actual water use is already on an upward
trend—consistent with our earlier example. The MDBA could learn from experiences in the Colorado
River Basin where field surveys and mapping, remote sensing, and return flow calculations are used to
account for water use and returns (see Bruce et al., 2019). However, an exploration of the economic incen-
tives behind illegal resource extractions—and the relevance of effective enforcement—underpins the
broader policy design and implementation discussion above.
A further issue that is becoming evident in Australia has been the transition toward inflexible production
systems that always require a fixed unit of water to maintain their capital integrity. As debated by
Adamson (2019), all production systems (social, natural, cultural, and economic) follow similar processes
involving water inputs that can be represented by fixed and variable requirements. Fixed water production
systems include perennial crops, permanent wetlands, and critical human water supplies, while variable
water production systems may be represented by ephemeral wetlands, recreation uses, and annual crops.
Any increased transition toward higher fixed water production system requirements may result in unin-
tended consequences such as capital loss where the net water demand in every year exceeds the ability of
supply sources and/or the market to reduce risk from climate variability. This is a topic of research that will
require some considerable future work to better understand and incorporate into science policy discussions.
7. Conclusion
Despite the best intentions of all parties during the development of Australia's water reforms, political
trade‐offs and rent seeking have delivered instances of second best outcomes—that is, a focus on technical
efficiency projects in the absence of allocative efficiency reductions. The Australian approach to water
reform has thus been reactive rather than proactive in terms of its design and implementation—resulting
in actual outcomes far‐removed from the original hypothesized arrangements. In this paper we have used
previous reform stages to examine progress toward fifth‐stage water demand reduction objectives within
an adaptive capacity framework, and attempted to analyze the potential trajectory for future Australian
water demand using a framework by Turton. The fifth‐stage path will only be revealed over time in response
to decisions made today. This highlights the importance of our current choices, and the role that both
science and politics have in making those decisions. Ideally, any fifth‐stage reforms should improve national
welfare via the recognition of increasing risk and uncertainty, the effective reallocation of resources in
response, and a capacity to reflect dynamic social expectations. Defining the fifth stage of water reforms in
the MDB may provide some additional assessment goalposts for periodic Basin Plan reviews.
This framework has applications that extend beyond water to describe and assess any critical resource (e.g.,
the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals, in particular SDG11: Sustainable Cities and Communities, SDG12:
Responsible Consumption and Production, and SDG13: Climate Action). In addition, the lessons learned from
this analysis of water reforms in Australia provides valuable insights for modern jurisdictions at earlier
stages of water management change and adaptation, where managers may invest in adaptive policy
design/implementation options that minimize future lock‐in costs, reflect the opportunity cost of public
expenditure, and result in adaptive arrangements more capable of responding to dynamic change and poli-
tical rent seeking. It also clearly highlights the need for Australian policy to reconsider the role that buyback
must play in future water demand reductions. Finally, the study also demonstrates a need for economists
10.1029/2019WR026714Water Resources Research
LOCH ET AL. 14 of 17
and water managers to extend their remit; that is, to work with government and social decision makers to
identify suitable transition pathway expertise and learn from other jurisdictions that are further ahead
(e.g., energy supply and renewables). The insights provided herein suggest policy makers should return to
planning for the long‐term and developing systems capable of dealing effectively with dynamic conditions
(e.g., adverse climate impacts on water supply and quality, revision in scientific knowledge, land use change
or totally new demands, and/or political and social preferences for better environments). Ultimately, it is our
view that astute water managers could skip the fourth stage completely, by identifying and investing in
robust public and private institutional designs capable of dealing with all future states.
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